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Comments

CRIME VICTIMS' COMPENSATION-TITLE I
OF THE PROPOSED VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT
OF 1973: AN ANALYSIS
1. Introduction
[I]n directing our full attention to how we can best combat the alarming crime
rise we have ignored, unfortunately, certain aspects of the problem. The point
has been reached, for example, where we must give consideration to the victim
of crime .... For him, society has failed miserably. Society has failed to protect
its members adequately. To those who suffer, society has an obligation.'

The concept that society has an obligation to help meet the needs
of victims of criminal violence arose almost 4,000 years ago.2 The Code
of Hammurabi provided that if the criminal was not apprehended "the
man who has been robbed, shall... make an itemized statement of his
loss, and the city and the governor... shall compensate him for whatever was lost." However, modem law has been more concerned with
the offense against society than with the compensation of the victim; the
criminal is thought to owe a debt to society which must be paid.4 Since
the offense is deemed to be against the state, it is the state which prosecutes the offender. The victim is not a party to the proceeding; his recourse against the offender is to initiate a private action in tort. Unfortunately, the expenses of litigation, the difficulties of apprehending the
alleged offender and the judgment-proof status of many of those apprehended are factors which militate against the adequacy of the victim's civil remedy.
The inadequacy of the victim's remedy in tort led Margery Fry, an
English penal reformer, to propose the first practical scheme of governmental compensation to victims of crime in modern times.5 In 1963,
1. 117 Cong. Rec. 2633 (1971) (remarks of Senator Mansfield).
2. Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury, 39 N.Y.
U.L. Rev. 444 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Childres].
3. Code of Hammurabi §§ 22-24 (c. 2250 B.C.) quoted in Harper, The
Code of Hammurabi 19 (1904).
4. 118 Cong. Rec. 15087 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1972) (remarks of Senator
McClellan).
5. Id. See Childres, supra note 2, at 451-55. A compensation scheme was
published in a report of a distinguished committee of justice-the British Section
of International Commission of Jurists-in Justice, Compensation for Victims of
Crimes of Violence 2 (1962); Childres, supra note 2, at 446 n.12, 451 n.39.
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nine years after Fry's proposals, New Zealand enacted the first crime
victims compensation statute.' The New Zealand statute established
a crime compensation tribunal which had discretionary power to award
public compensation from an indemnity fund to the victim or his dependents, when he had been injured or killed through the commission of
certain specified offenses, including homicides, assaults and woundings,
and sexual offenses of violence.7 Compensation was authorized for outof-pocket expenses, loss of earnings, and pain and suffering, and the
tribunal was empowered to order the victim to refund all or part of an
award if he subsequently recovered damages from the wrongdoer.8
In 1964, Great Britain put into operation a program somewhat similar
to the New Zealand statute.9 In the United States, the first jurisdiction to
adopt a compensation scheme for the victims of crime was California' °
in 1965. Subsequently, crime victims compensation statutes were enacted
in New York" in 1966; Hawaii' 2 and Massachusetts 3 in 1967; MaryThis report has been favorably discussed in Griew, Compensation for Victims of
Crimes of Violence, 1962 Crim. L. Rev. (Eng.) 801. See also Compensation for
Victims of Criminal Violence: A Round Table, 8 J. Pub. L. 191 (1959), which
consists of reactions and criticism from commentators to Fry's proposal for governmental compensation to victims of crimes of violence.
6. Pub. Act No. 134 [N.Z. 1963]. For a commentary on the New Zealand
program see Cameron, Compensation for Victims of Crime: The New Zealand
Experiment, 12 J. Pub. L. 367 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Cameron].
7. Cameron, supra note 6, at 370-71 n.16.
8. Id. at 373-74.
9. Home Office and Scottish Home & Health Dep't, Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence, Cmnd. No. 2323 (1964). For commentary on this
compensation scheme see Samuels, Compensation for Criminal Injuries in Britain,
17 U. Tor. L.J. 20 (1967); Note, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1683 (1965). Criminal victims
compensation legislation has also been proposed and enacted in a few Canadian
provinces and Australia. See generally Chappell, Compensating Austrailian Victims of Violent Crimes, 41 Aust. L.J. 3 (1967); Note, Awards of the Crimes
Compensation Board, 33 Sask. L. Rev. 209 (1968).
10. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 13960-66, 13970-74 (West Supp. 1972). Sections
13960-66 provide for indemnification of private citizens who are victims of crime.
Sections 13970-74 grant compensation to citizens who are victimized when they
attempt to prevent the commission of crime, apprehend a criminal or rescue a
person in immediate danger, on the theory that these citizens are benefiting the
public.
11. N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 620-35 (McKinney 1972), as amended, (McKinney
Supp. 1972).
12. Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 351-1 to -70 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1972).
13. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258A §§ 1-7 (1968).

1973]

CRIME VICTIMS' COMPENSATION

423

land 4 in 1968; Nevada 15 in 1969; New Jersey' 6 in 1971; and most
recently, Rhode Island 17 and Alaska 8 in 1972.
There are three main theories upon which these modem compensation
statutes have been based.' 9 At one extreme is the social welfare theory
of compensation. This theory is not based on any "inherent" obligation on
the part of the sovereign, but rather rests upon the idea that the "twentieth century conscience cannot tolerate the suffering" which befalls
the victim of crime.20 At the other extreme is a theory of compensation
which assumes that there is an inherent duty of the sovereign to indemnify those members of its society whom it fails to protect from
criminal victimization. 2 ' This might be termed the legal right theory
which is founded on an implied contract between the state and its
citizens.2 The citizen undertakes to pay his taxes; the state undertakes
to protect him from criminal violence.2 8 Thus, in failing to protect the
victim from criminal violence the state breaches the implied contract
and is obligated to compensate the victim for injuries resulting from the
breach. A third theory, which might be called one of legislative gracelying somewhere between the extremes-is that the sovereign has a
moral obligation to deal "mercifully with individuals" who are the innocent victims of crime.2 4 While all compensation statutes rest on one
of the aforementioned theories, in practice the statutes can best be distinguished by (1) the presence or absence of a requirement of financial
need, and (2) the nature of the proceeding through which the claimant
receives his award-i.e., administrative or judicial.
14. Md. Ann. Code art. 26A §§ 1-17 (Supp. 1971), as amended, (Interim
Supp. 1972).
15. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 217.010 to .260 (1971).
16. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:4B-1 to -21 (Supp. 1972).
17. R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 12-25-1 to -12 (Supp. 1972) [effective one hundred twenty days following enactment of the federal statute].
18. Alaska Stat. §§ 18.67.010 to .180 (Supp. 1972).
19. Report of the Special Comm'n on the Compensation of Victims of Violent
Crimes, Mass. H. Doc. No. 5151, 10-14 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967
Mass. Report].
20. Id. at 11.
21. Id. at 10-11.
22. Kutner, Crime-Torts: Due Process of Compensation for Crime Victims,
41 Notre Dame Law. 487, 497-98 (1966).
23. Id.

24.

1967 Mass. Report at 12.

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. I

II. Proposed Federal Legislation

In the United States, proposals for legislation in this area have also
been made on the federal level.25 Unfortunately, none of these proposals
has been enacted. 26 Title I of the proposed Victims of Crime Act of
1973, which is based upon the legislative grace or moral obligation
theory, 28 is the latest and most comprehensive in scope of the federal
proposals. It possibly could become law in the first session of the NinetyThird Congress.

The purpose of this comment is to analyze and explain the operation
of the. major provisions of Title I. The provisions discussed are those
relating to the scope of compensation, limitations and requirements for
25. E.g., S. 2994, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 750, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971); H.R. 3963, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 4576, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970); S. 9, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 646, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967);
S. 2155, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. 11818, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965);
H.R. 11552, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. 11291, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965); H.R. 11211, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. 10896, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965).
26. Opposition to these proposals has centered around the belief that these
proposals will quickly grow in expense, that the indemnity fund (see notes 133-36
infra and accompanying text) will in no way provide sufficient monies, and that
the problem can best be left to the states. 118 Cong. Rec. 15092 (daily ed.
Sept. 18, 1972). See generally Hearings on S. 16, S. 33, S. 750, S. 1946, S. 2087,
S. 2426, S. 2748, S. 2856, S. 2994 and S. 2995 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
27. S. 800, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The Victims of Crime Act of 1973
contains five titles. In addition to Title I [hereinafter cited as Title I], Title II
establishes a federal-state group life and disability insurance program for state
and local public safety officers, including policemen, firefighters, and correctional
guards. Title III establishes federal minimum death or disability benefits for public safety officers, their families or dependents, for death or disability in the line
of duty as a result of a criminal offense. Title IV strengthens the procedural implementation of the civil remedies available to victims of racketeering activity
under the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. Title V [hereinafter cited as
Title V] includes provisions for effective dates and authorization for appropriations for the other titles of the bill. 119 Cong. Rec. 2263-71 (daily ed. Feb. 7,
1973). Title I consists of §§ 101-07. Section 102 incorporates § 450-60 into
Title I. Id. at 2263-66.
28. Statement of Findings and Purpose, S. 800, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
29. The Victims of Crime Act of 1972 passed the Senate September 18, 1972
by a vote of 74 to 0, 118 Cong. Rec. 15148 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1972). By the
close of the 2d Session of the 92d Congress, the bill had not been presented on
the House floor.
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recovery, and procedures for the disposition of claims. Where useful, the
federal proposal will be compared with existing statutes in New York,"0
Hawaii" and Massachusetts.82 These laws are representative of the
various state compensation statutes in that New York employs an
administrative proceeding and requires financial need; 8 Hawaii utilizes
an administrative proceeding but does not require financial need;84 and
Massachusetts uses a judicial proceeding. 8 [See chart pages 426-31.]
Where the comparison indicates that improvements can be made in
Title I, they will be suggested.
Title I may be grouped with those crime victim compensation statutes
which require a showing of financial need and have a proceeding which
is administrative in nature. 6 It establishes a federal program of compensation for victims and intervenors where the crime takes place within
the federal jurisdiction 7 and also grants reimbursement of up to 75 per
cent of the costs to those states which have victim compensation statutes
that are "substantially comparable in coverage and limitations" 8 to Title
I. While the analysis that follows is limited to the program of direct
federal compensation to those victimized by crime within the federal
30. N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 620-35 (McKinney 1972), as amended, (McKinney
Supp.1972).
31. Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 351-1 to -70 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1972).
32. Mass. Ann.Laws ch. 258A §§ 1-7 (1968).
33. N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 620, 622-23, 631 (McKinney 1972). See also Cal.
Gov't Code §9 13960, 13962-63 (West Supp. 1972); Md. Ann. Code art. 26A

§§ 3, 12(f) (Supp. 1971).
34. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 351-11 to -13 (1968). See Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 351-31
(Supp. 1972). See also Alaska Stat. §§ 18.67.020, 18.67.080(c) (need is to be

considered with other relevant circumstances)

(Supp. 1972); Nev. Rev. Stat.

§§ 217.030, 217.100, 217.160, 217.200 (1971); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:4B-3 to -10

(Supp. 1972).
35. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258A §'2 (1968). See also R.I. Gen. Laws §

12-

25-2(2) to -3(Supp. 1972).
36. See notes 30, 33 supra and accompanying text.
37.

Title I § 456(a) -(b). See 119 Cong. Rec. 2262 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1973)

(remarks of Senator McClellan).
38. Title I § 105. See 119 Cong. Rec. 2262 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1973) (remarks
of Senator McClellan). It remains to be seen whether certain features of exist-

ing state statutes that are in conflict with the corresponding provisions in Title I
i.e., no financial need requirement in Hawaii and Massachusetts, and compensation for pain and suffering in Hawaii, will prevent these statutes from meeting
the test of substantial comparability. S.2994, a predecessor of S. 800 provided
specific criteria for determining whether a state's program qualified for the federal grant. S.2994, § 106 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), 117 Cong. Rec. 21334
(daily ed. Dec. 11, 1971).
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jurisdiction, it is clear that in light of the requirement of substantial
comparability,8 9 Title I will serve as a model for states which have not
yet enacted compensation statutes.
H.

Tide I of the Victims of Crime Act of 1973

A. Scope of Compensation
It is the declared purpose of Congress in this title to promote the public welfare
by establishing a means of meeting the financial needs of the innocent victims of
violent crime or their surviving dependents and intervenors acting to prevent40 the
commission of crime or to assist in.the apprehension of suspected criminals.

While Title I compensates the innocent victim and the intervenor, it
makes three significant distinctions between the two classes of claimants,
each of which favors the intervenor. The distinctions concern (1) the
type of loss each may recover, (2) the requirements of financial stress
for victims and (3) the existence of a maximum recovery for victims.
Although the proposal is silent as to the purpose of these distinctions,
one must conclude that Congress has set out to encourage third parties to
assist fellow citizens and to aid law enforcement officials. Each of these
distinctions shall now be examined.
The first significant distinction is that a victim can recover "pecuniary
losses""' whereas an intervenor can recover "net losses. '4 2 "Pecuniary
losses" are those net losses "which cover" the list of enumerated damages.
They are generally all reasonable and necessary medical, hospital and
rehabilitation expenses, actual loss of past earnings, anticipated loss
39. Title I § 105.
40. Id. § 101. Section 450(18) defines a victim as "a person who is killed or
who suffers personal injury where the proximate cause of such death or personal
injury is-(A) a crime enumerated in section 456 . . . or (B) the not reckless
actions of an intervenor in attempting to prevent the commission or reasonably
suspected commission of a crime enumerated in section 456 . . . or in attempting

to apprehend a person reasonably suspected of having committed such a crime."
Section 450(7) defines dependent as "(A) a surviving spouse; (B) an individual
who is a dependent of the deceased victim or intervenor within the meaning of
section 152 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 152); or (C) a
posthumous child of the deceased intervenor or victim . . . ." Section 450(11)
defines intervenor as "a person who goes to the aid of another and is killed or injured while acting not recklessly to prevent the commission or reasonably suspected
commission of a crime enumerated in section 456 . . . or while acting not recklessly to apprehend a person reasonably suspected of having committed such a
crime....
41. Id.§ 453(b)(2).
42. Id.§ 453(b)(1).
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of future earnings and reasonable and necessary child care expenses
enabling either the victim or his or her spouse to continue gainful employment. 48 "Net losses" are gross losses, excluding pain and suffering."
Since "gross losses" are defined as "all damages, including pain and
suffering and including property losses, 45 it appears that, despite clumsy
language, the significant distinction is that net losses include property
losses whereas pecuniary losses do not. While Title I does not define
"property losses," the words are probably used in the traditional sense,
i.e., damages other than personal injury.
The definition of pecuniary losses creates some confusion as to
whether they include only those losses enumerated or whether the list
is intended to be merely illustrative. If the prior meaning is the intended
one, the ambiguity can be removed by changing the word "cover" to
"cover exclusively;" if the latter meaning is intended, the word "cover"
can be replaced by "cover, but not limited to."
The second significant distinction between intervenors and victims is
that a victim must establish "financial stress" as a result of his pecuniary
loss, whereas an intervenor's net losses are recoverable without such
stress.46 "Financial stress" is defined as:
the undue financial strain experienced by a victim or his surviving dependent or
dependents as the result of pecuniary loss from an act, omission, or possession
giving rise to a claim .... 4T

Failure of the Board to find such financial stress will result in a denial
of the victim's claim.4 . While New York also requires a showing of
financial need, its test is "serious financial hardship. '' 49 Whether any
43.
penses
44.
45.

46.

Id. § 450(16). Anticipated loss of future earnings and child care exare recoverable up to $150 and $30 per week, respectively.
Id. § 450(15).
Id. § 450(9).

Id. § 454(a).

47. Id. § 450(8).
48. Id. § 454(a). However, the statute lists-the, following items, ownership
of which will be disregarded in determining whether or not financial stress exists:
a residence, normal household items and personal effects, an automobile, tools
of trade, and liquid assets not in excess of one year's gross income or $10,000 in
value, whichever is less. Id. §§ 450(8)(A)-(E). Whether or not there should be
a requirement of a showing of financial need in a crime victims compensation
statute has been discussed in Childres, supra note 2, at 462; Wolfgang, Victim
Compensation in Crimes of Personal Violence, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 223, 234-35
(1965); Comment, Victims of Violent Crime: Should They Be an Object of Social
Effection?, 40 Miss. L.J. 92, 120 (1968).
49. N.Y. Exec. Law § 631(6) (McKinney 1972). The term "serious-financial

434
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difference will develop between the federal and New York tests of
financial stress and serious financial hardship cannot be determined
requirement
at this time. Hawaii5 ° and Massachusetts 5' have no such
52
right.
legal
of
matter
a
is
states
these
in
recovery
since
It is noteworthy that Hawaii is the only state that compensates the
victim for pain and suffering.53 New York and Title I do not, presumably
hardship" is not defined by the statute. However, "Ctlhe board shall establish specific standards by rule for determining such serious financial hardship." Id. For
such standards, see Crime Victims Compensation Board [hereinafter cited as
CVCB], Rules Governing Practice and Procedure [hereinafter cited as CVCB
Rules] § 525.8 Rule VIII(8) (Nov. 1968, amending Rule VIII(8) of Sept. 1967).
Under the New York rules the following are not considered in computing financial
resources: a homestead, personal property consisting of clothing and strictly personal effects, household furniture, appliances and equipment, tools and equipment
necessary for the claimant's trade, occupation or business, a family automobile,
and life insurance, except in death claims. Id. The Amendments of May, 1971 have
lessened the strictness of the need requirement somewhat and now provide that the
"Board ... shall exempt ... [ain amount not exceeding the victim's annual income." Furthermore, the Board may in its discretion consider the lowering of the
victim's individual standard of living in determining "serious financial hardship."
CVCB Rules § 525.8 Rule VIII (8(g)), (9) (May 1971, amending Rule VIII
(8(a)), (9) of Nov. 1968). There is a "need" requirement in Md. Ann. Code art.
26A § 12(f) (Supp. 1971), and one for "victims" only, in Cal. Gov't Code
§§ 13960, 13963 (West Supp. 1972). However, there is no "need" requirement in
California for "private citizens" (intervenors). See Cal. Gov't Code § 13972 (West
Supp. 1972).
50. See Hawaii Rev. Stat. 99 351-31 (Supp.1972).
51. See Mass. Ann.Laws ch. 258A §§ 3,6 (1968).
52. "Need" is a consideration, but not a requirement for compensation, in
Alaska Stat. § 18.67.080(c) (Supp. 1972) and Nev. Rev. Stat. § 217.180(1)
(1971). The Nevada statute compensates only intervenors. See Nev. Rev. Stat.
§§ 217.070 & 217.160 (1971). The statutes in New Jersey and Rhode Island
require no showing of "need" for recovery. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:4B-1 to -21
(Supp. 1972); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 12-25-1 to -12 (Supp. 1972).
53. Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 351-33(4) & 351-52(2) (1968). Rhode Island is
the only other enacted statute which allows recovery for pain and suffering. See

R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-25-5(c) (Supp. 1972). However, the statute is not
yet in operation. See note 17 supra. For a more complete discussion on whether
or not recovery for pain and suffering should be granted, see Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 271, 278 (1965);
Starrs, A Modest Proposal to Insure Justice for Victims of Crime, 50 Minn. L.
Rev. 285, 306-08 (1965); Comment, Compensation for Victims of CrimeSome Practical Considerations, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 645, 653 (1966); Comment,
Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence, 30 Albany L. Rev. 325, 332
(1966); Comment, Crime Victim Compensation: The New York Solution, 35
Albany L. Rev. 717, 731 (1971).
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because pain and suffering, no matter how great, do not cause "serious
financial hardship" or "financial stress."
The third and final distinction between the victim and the intervenor
in the federal proposal is the provision for a $50,000 maximum on any
claim by a "victim" or his surviving dependents.54 Since this section
mentions only "victims" it would appear that, on its face, the statute
permits an intervenor to recover all his net losses up to and exceeding
the maximum otherwise applicable to victims. The state statutes have a
lower maximum recovery schedule than does the federal legislation. In
New York the maximum recovery for losses of support and income is
$15,000," 5 although significantly, there is no ceiling on the amount of
compensation the Board will grant for out-of-pocket expenses. 56 Hawaii
and Massachusetts limit recovery to $10,000 for all losses.57 Since
Title I provides for direct grants to the states of up to 75 per cent of the
costs of their compensation statutes, 58 it is submitted that the states can
raise their maximums on awards to reduce still further the possibility of
hardship to a victim and his dependents.
The federal proposal, New York and Massachusetts require a minimum loss in order to exclude frivolous claims that would otherwise
consume a substantial part of the Board's time.59 The federal minimum
is the equivalent of a week's earnings or support.6" New York and
Massachusetts require the claimant's loss to exceed $100 or two weeks'
2
earnings or support. 1 Hawaii has no such minimum.
54. Title I § 454(e).
55. N.Y. Exec. Law § 631(3) (McKinney 1972). The highest maximum
recovery authorized among the states is $25,000 in Rhode Island. R.I. Gen. Laws
Ann. § 12-25-6(b) (Supp. 1972).
56. N.Y. Exec. Law § 631(2) (McKinney 1972).
57. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 351-62(b) (1968); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258A § 5
(1968).

58.

See note 38 supra and accompanying text. See also Title V, supra note 27,

at §§ 501-02.
59. Title I § 454(c); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258A § 5 (1958); N.Y. Exec. Law
§ 626 (McKinney 1972). For similar provisions, see Md. Ann. Code art. 26A
§ 7 (Supp. 1971); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:4B-18 (Supp. 1972). For application of

this provision in New York see CVCB 3d Annual Rep. 35, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 97
(1970) (hereinafter cited as 1969 N.Y. Report).
60.
61.

Title I § 454(c).
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258A § 5 (1968); N.Y. Exec. Law § 626 (McKin-

ney 1972).
62.

See Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 351-1 to -70 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1972).

Similarly see Alaska Stat. §§ 18.67.010 to .180 (Supp. 1972); Cal. Gov't Code
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Recovery of an award by the claimant under Title I would result in
double recovery if the claimant has been or will be compensated by
collateral sources. Accordingly, Title I provides for set-offs of such
recoveries, 8 as do all state statutes in varying ways.64 Collateral sources
under Title I include monies recovered or recoverable:
(A) under insurance programs mandated by law;
(B) from the United States, a State, or unit of general local government for a
personal injury or death otherwise compensable under this part;
(C) under contract or insurance wherein the claimant is the insured or beneficiary; or
(D) by other public or private means .... 65

However, the effects of the set-offs are often alleviated by the fact that
collateral source recovery is "first used to offset gross losses that do not
qualify as net or pecuniary ....

"66

The above language will permit a vic-

tim to use collateral sources to compensate for his property losses and
pain and suffering, the two most important non-compensable losses. New
York and Massachusetts simply set-off any collateral payment from the
award.6 7 Hawaii permits a claimant to add to the award any sum recovered from the criminal to the extent his losses exceed the maximum
award. 68 Perhaps the best scheme is a recently proposed, but unsuccessful, amendment in Massachusetts which offsets compensation from
collateral sources, "but only to the extent that the sum of such payments
and any award . . . are in excess of the total compensable injuries

suffered by the victim ... .." The Massachusetts proposal would prevent double recovery and, unlike the other statutes, ° would permit a
victim to recover under these circumstances the full amount of his losses.
Thus the Massachusetts proposed amendment more simply and consistently accomplishes the desired result, i.e., preventing double recovery
§§ 13960-66, 13970-74 (West Supp. 1972); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 217.010 to .260
(1971); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 12-25-1 to -12 (Supp. 1972).
63. Title I § 453(g).
64. E.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 351-63(a) (Supp. 1972); Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 258A § 6 (1968); N.Y. Exec. Law § 631(4) (McKinney 1972).
65. Title I § 450(15).
66. Id.§ 453(g)(1).
67. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258A § 6 (1968); N.Y. Exec. Law § 631(4)
(McKinney 1972). The collateral payments must have come from sources
specified in the statutes.
68. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 351-35 (1968).
69. Mass. H. Act No. 2854 (1972).
70. See note 64 supra.
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and excessive drain on the government's funds, while at the same time
permitting the claimant to, as nearly as possible, be made whole.
There remain two further provisions that affect the scope of compensation. The first seems reasonable enough in that it gives the Board discretion to consider the claimant's behavior and contribution to the
crime, 7 and to reduce the award "in accordance with its assessment of
the degree of" that contribution or deny altogether any award if his
behavior was a "substantial contributing factor. ' 7' However, the second
provision provides that "[n]o order for compensation ... shall be made
to... a member of the family or household" of the wrongdoer. 74 While
the rationale for both exclusions is to prevent one from profiting from
his own wrongdoing and to prevent fraud and collusion, the second is
not only unnecessary but can also result in significant hardship:
Those family members who provoke, or are in part responsible, for the violence
should of course be dealt with as [provided]. But I would suggest no more is
needed. If a father shoots and disables a small child, surely that child is as de75
serving as a child who lives next door.
71. Title I § 454(g).
72. Id. § 454(g) (1). In the three states, as in Title I, the amount of compensation may be reduced or denied in proportion to the degree of the claimant's
responsibility for the crime giving rise to the claim. See Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 35131(c) (Supp. 1972); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258A § 6 (1968); N.Y. Exec. Law
§ 631(5) (McKinney 1972).
73. Title I § 454(g) (2).
74. Id. § 454(h). Despite this limitation, nowhere in Title I is the term "family" defined. New York and Massachusetts have similar family member exclusions, but define the term "family." See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258A §§ 1, 3
(1968); N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 621(4), 624(2) (McKinney 1972). See also Alaska
Stat. §§ 18.67.130(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1972); Md. Ann. Code art. 26A §§ 2(d),
5(b) (Supp. 1971); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 217.220(1)(a), (b) (1971); N.J. Stat.
Ann. §§ 52:4B-2 (Supp. 1972). There is no such restriction in Hawaii and
California. See Cal. Gov't Code §§ 13960-66, 13970-74 (West Supp. 1972);
Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 351-1 to -70 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1972).
75. Hearings, supra note 26, at 1005. The statute in Hawaii avoids this hardship. See Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 351-31(c) (Supp. 1972). For criticism of the family
member exclusion see Comment, New York Crime Victims Compensation Board
Act: Four Years Later, 7 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 25, 41 (1971). However, in
New York during the period 1968 to 1970, only a comparatively small number of
claims have been disallowed because of the family member exclusion. The figures
are compiled from CVCB-2d Annual Rep. 7-8, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 100 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as 1968 N.Y. Report]; 1969 N.Y. Report, supra note 59, at 1011; CVCB 4th Annual Rep. 10-11, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 95 (1971) (hereinafter
cited as 1970 N.Y. Report), and are as follows:
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Requirements and Limitations

The threshold requirement to recovery under any compensation statute is that there be a nexus between the sovereign and either the crime
or the victim. New York requires simply that the crime occur within the
state;. no distinction is made between residents and non-residents. California, on the other hand, will grant compensation to a "domiciliary"
wherever the crime occurs, and to a "resident" only if the crime occurs
within the state.7 While neither "domiciliary" nor "resident" is defined
in the statute it appears that California would not compensate "transients" injured in the state. Hawaii compensates a victim for injury resulting from conduct "within the criminal jurisdiction of the State .... "7 8
Thus, Hawaii will only compensate the victim if it could have prosecuted the assailant. Massachusetts, like New York, requires that the
crime occur within the state;79 and by requiring that "claims shall be
brought in a district court within the territorial jurisdiction in which the
claimant lives," it limits compensation to residents of the state.80 Title I
follows the New York approach in that it requires the crime to occur
within the federal jurisdiction-the District of Columbia, the maritime
or territorial jurisdiction of the United States and Indian country"'
The second fundamental requirement to recovery under any compensation statute is that the crime be a violent one. Hawaii lists the specific
crimes to which its statute applies.8 2 Massachusetts requires only that
Total
Disallowed Disallowed Claims for
Claims
Family Membership

Year

Total Awards

1968
1969

220
336

202
490

2
9

1970

458

632

6

Yet the growing number of claims makes the exclusion a bar to compensation
for a potentially large number of innocent, injured people. "The claims have increased each year since the inception of the Board." 1970 N.Y. Report 5.
76. N.Y. Exec. Law § 621(3) (McKinney 1972).
77. Cal. Gov't Code § 13962 (West Supp. 1972).
78. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 351-2 (1968).
79. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258A § 1 (1968).
80.

Id. § 2.

81. Title I § 456(a)(1)-(3).
82. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 351-32 (1968). These crimes are: (1) arson; (2)
intermediate assault or battery; (3) aggravated assault or battery or any other
aggravated assault offense enacted by law; (4) use of dangerous substances;

(5) murder; (6) manslaughter; (7) kidnapping; (8) child-stealing; (9) unlawful
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the crime involve "the application of force or violence or the threat of
force or violence .... ,, New York requires merely that the victim suffer "personal physical injury"84 from a crime "proscribed by the penal
law... ."85 Title I lists specific crimes 6 and adds a catch-all provision"any other crime, including poisoning, which poses a substantial threat
of personal injury ...

."' This is perhaps the preferable approach in

that it avoids the vagueness that can result from a broad and general
definition of crimes; and at the same time, the use of a catch-all provision overcomes the disadvantages inherent in a closed-end listing of
specific crimes which cannot deal with changes in the criminal law. It

is interesting to note that while victims injured inadvertently by an intervenor may recover under Title I, a victim injured by a would-be
intervenor who acts recklessly will not.88 This results from Congress'
intent to deny recovery to those who act recklessly. 9 But while this intent is equitable when applied to the reckless would-be intervenor, it is

inequitable to deny recovery to the victim of such recklessness. This
result could be avoided by expanding the definition of victim to include
those injured by would-be intervenors.
use of explosives; (10) sexual intercourse with a female under sixteen; (11) assault with intent to rape or ravish; (12) indecent assault; (13) carnal abuse of
female under twelve; (14) rape; and (15) attempted rape. The Alaska statute
also specifies the crimes covered. See Alaska Stat. § 18.67.100(2) (Supp. 1972).
83. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258A § (1968).
84. N.Y. Exec. Law § 621(5) (McKinney 1972).
85. Id. § 621(3).
86. Title I § 456(b)(1)-(18) specifies the following acts, omissions, or possessions: "(1) aggravated assault; (2) arson; (3) assault; (4) burglary; (5) forcible sodomy; (6) kidnapping; (7) manslaughter; (8) mayhem; (9) murder; (10)
negligent homicide; (11) rape; (12) robbery; (13) riot; (14) unlawful sale or
exchange of drugs; (15) unlawful use of explosives; (16) unlawful use of firearms; (17) any other crime including poisoning, which poses a substantial threat
of personal injury; or (18) attempts to commit any of the foregoing." Section
456(c) reads: "For the purposes of this part, the operation of a motor vehicle,
boat, or aircraft that results in an injury or death shall not constitute a crime unless the injuries were intentionally inflicted through the use of such vehicle, boat,
or aircraft or unless such vehicle, boat, or aircraft is an implement of a crime to
which this part applies."
87. Id. § 456(b)(17). N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:4B-11(b) (Supp. 1972) and
R.I Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-25-4 (Supp. 1972) are similar to Title I, in that in
addition to listing the crimes, these statutes provide a catch-all clause which
includes generally any other violent crime resulting in a personal injury or death.
88. Title I § 450(18)(B).
89. By definition, one who acts recklessly is not an intervenor. See id.

§ 450(11), supra note 40.
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Under Title I, the victim must also comply with three additional requirements. The crime must be reported "to law enforcement officials
within seventy-two hours after its occurrence." 90 Moreover, the claimant
must have "substantially cooperated with all law enforcement agencies."'" If the claimant breaches this duty the Board is empowered to
"reduce, deny or withdraw any order for compensation."92 Finally, unless otherwise justified by good cause, the claim must be filed within one
year of the date of the occurrence.9 California9 4 and Maryland95 also
require cooperation with law enforcement officials, and New York,9"
Hawai? 7 and Massachusetts98 have similar filing provisions, ranging in
time from ninety days to eighteen months.
C.

Procedures

Title I establishes an administrative body within the Department of
Justice, to be known as the "Violent Crimes Compensation Board"99
90. Title I § 454(d). Failure to report within the specified time may be
waived if good cause is shown. Id. Also the report does not necessarily have to be
made by the victim or claimant. Id. For similar provisions see Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 258A § 5 (1968) (48 hours); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:4B-18 (Supp. 1972) (3
months); N.Y. Exec. Law § 631(1) (McKinney 1972) (48 hours). There is no
such requirement in California, Hawaii or Rhode Island. See Cal. Gov't Code
§§ 13960-66, 13970-74 (West Supp. 1972); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 351-1 to -70
(1968), as amended, (Supp. 1972); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 12-25-1 to -12
(Supp. 1972).
91. Title I § 454(f). For similar provisions see Cal. Gov't Code § 13963
(West Supp. 1972); Md. Ann. Code art. 26A § 12(a)(3) (Supp. 1971). There is
no such duty in most of the states. See Alaska Stat. §§ 18.67.010 to .180 (Supp.
1972); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 351-1 to -70 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1972);
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258A §§ 1-7 (1968); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:4B-1 to -21
(Supp. 1972); N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 620-35 (McKinney 1972), as amended,
(McKinney Supp. 1972).
92. Title I § 454(f).
93. Id. § 454(b).
94. Cal. Gov't Code § 13963 (West Supp. 1972).
95. Md. Ann. Code art. 26A § 12(a) (Supp. 1971).
96. N.Y. Exec. Law § 625(2) (McKinney 1972) (90 days or up to one year
for good cause shown).
97. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 351-62(a) (1968) (18 months).
98. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258A § 4 (1968) (1 year from occurrence or 90
days from death, whichever is earlier). See also Alaska Stat. § 18.67.130(a)
(Supp. 1972) (2 years); Md. Ann. Code art. 26A § 6(b) (Supp. 1971) (180
days or up to 2 years for good cause shown); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:4B-18 (Supp.
1972) (1 year).
99. Title I § 451(a).
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which "shall order the payment of compensation"' 100 in appropriate
cases. The Board is authorized to "promulgate such rules and regulations as may be required" 10 ' and to "establish a program to assure
extensive and continuing publicity [of the Title's existence] ... including
information on the right to fie a claim, the scope of coverage, and procedures .... ",102
The statute in New York creates an autonomous administrative body
within the Executive Department, known as the Crime Victims Compensation Board. 0 3 which has the power "[t]o adopt, promulgate, amend
and rescind suitable rules and regulations to carry out the provisions and
purposes" of the statute. 0 4 The Hawaii statute establishes an independent administrative agency, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Commission, 1°5 which may adopt rules and regulations to aid in the performance of its functions. 10 6 In Massachusetts, on the other hand, the
"district courts of the commonwealth shall ... have jurisdiction to determine and award compensation to victims of crimes.' 0 7
Title I has some distinct procedural advantages over a statute that
looks to the judiciary for its administration. For example, the Board
will have the freedom to relax some of the formalities that ordinarily
attend a judicial proceeding. The Board may likewise avoid the delays
of the crowded courts of our larger cities, where presumably most victims would be found. Since the Board is independent and is intended to
deal with only one problem, i.e., crime victim's compensation, it need
not be burdened by extraneous rules as it might be if it were part of a
larger, pre-existing agency.
The authority of the Board to promulgate its own rules and regula100. Id § 453(a) reads: "(1) in the case of the personal injury of an intervenor or victim, to or on behalf of that person; or (2) in the case of the death of
the intervenor or victim, to or on behalf of the surviving dependent or dependents
of either of them." Since the compensation provided for under Title I is based on
a moral obligation rather than on a legal right, there is a requirement that "need"
be shown before compensation will be granted. See notes 24, 46-52 supra and
accompanying text. The administrative functions of the board are detailed in Title I
§ 452(l)-(11).
101. Id. § 452(3).
102. Id.§ 452(11).
103. N.Y. Exec. Law § 622 (1) (McKinney 1972).

104. Id. § 623(3). There are similar rule making powers in other compensation statutes. See, e.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 26A § 4(b) (Supp. 1971).

105. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 351-11 (1968).
106. Id. § 351-68.
107.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258A § 2 (1968).
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helps to assure that any expertise gained in administering the

statute will be tangibly implemented in the form of substantive and procedural guidelines. The power of the Board to establish a program of
extensive and continuing publicity of the statute's existence, operation,
and coverage' 09 is clearly desirable since the usefulness of any such statute is predicated upon the people's knowledge of its existence."10
Under Title I, when the claim is filed, the Chairman of the Board
may assign one member to evaluate the claim."' If the claimant is not
satisfied with the evaluation he is entitled, as a matter of right, to a de
novo hearing by the full three-man Board" 2 where he must prove his
claim by a "preponderance of the evidence.""a 8 Once the Board renders
a final order, the claimant may obtain judicial review"14 in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia."' "No finding of
fact supported by substantial evidence" will be set aside on review." 0
At the conclusion of the Board's proceeding, an attorney may file with
the Board a statement for a fee for services rendered. 117 The Board will
award a fee on substantially similar terms as provided in the Criminal
Justice Act." 8 The payment of a fee to an attorney does not diminish
the claimant's award." 9 Hawaii and Massachusetts permit payment of
attorney fees up to 15 per cent of the award,' 2° but the fees diminish
108. Title I § 452 (3).
109. Id.§452(11).
110. In New York, for example, it has been commented that the public is not
yet well informed as to the existence and operation of the New York statute. See
Comment, Crime Compensation: The New York Solution, 35 Albany L. Rev. 717,
730 & nn.109 & 110, 730-31 & n.111, 731 & n.112. See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 15,
1973, at 45, col. 1 - 3, at 86, col. 1-3.
111. Title I §455(e)(1).
112. Id. § 455(e)(2).
113. Id. § 455(f)(1).
114. Id. § 455(h).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. § 455(g)(1).
118. Id. § 455(g) (2). The section of the Criminal Justice Act referred to is
found in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970). It deals with the rates and qualifications
for payment of attorneys' fees for indigent clients. The rates are not to exceed $30
per hour for an attorney's time expended in court, and $20 per hour for his time
expended out of court. Id. § 3006A(d) (1).
119. See Title I, § 455(g)(2); 118 Cong. Rec. 15089 (daily ed. Sept. 18,
1972).
120. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 351-16 (1968); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258A § 4
(1968). In Hawaii, the 15 per cent maximum applies only to awards greater than

1973]

CRIME VICTIMS' COMPENSATION

the claimant's award.' 21 In New York, the Board is authorized to adopt
"suitable rules... for the approval of attorneys' fees .... "I
Prior to final action, the Board may authorize emergency compensation not to exceed $1,500 if it determines that the claim "probably" will
result in an order of compensation. 12' The amount of the emergency
payment is deducted from the final award; 124 and if the claimant is ultimately denied compensation, he is liable to the Board for its repayment' 25 unless the Board waives it.

New York

27

20

and Hawaii28 also provide for emergency payments,

whereas Massachusetts 129 does not, presumably because it employs a
judicial proceeding rather than an administrative one.
Once compensation has been awarded to a victim, both the federal
$1,000, "provided that the amount of the attorneys' fees shall not, in any event,
exceed the award of compensation remaining after deducting that portion thereof
for expenses actually incurred by the claimant." Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 351-16
(1968).
121. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 351-16 (1968); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258A § 4
(1968). See Title I § 455 (g)(1)-(3). See also 118 Cong. Rec. 15090 (daily
ed. Sept. 18, 1972).
122. N.Y. Exec. Law § 623(3) (MeKinney 1972).
123. TitleI§453(e)(1).
124. Id.§ 453(e)(2).
125. Id.§ 453(e) (3). Ifthe emergency payment was greater than the amount
of the final order, the recipient isliable only for the excess. Id.
126. Id.
127. N.Y. Exec. Law § 630 (McKinney 1972). In New York, "if it appears
to the board member to whom a claim is assigned, prior to taking action upon
such claim that, (a) such claim is one with respect to which an award probably
will be made, and (b) undue hardship will result to the claimant if immediate
payment is not made, such board member may make an emergency award to the
claimant .... ." Id. However, the award may not exceed $500. Id. The amount of
the emergency award will be deducted from the final award; and in the event the
claim is denied, the emergency payment must be refunded to the board. Id.
128. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 351-62.5 (Supp. 1972). The conditions for these
emergency payments are that the Commission must have made an award and it
then "determines that there is an immediate need of funds in order to meet expenses incurred as a direct or indirect result of injury or death . . . ." Id. The
amount of the emergency payment is deducted from the amount of the final award
and the amount deducted is redeposited in the emergency payment fund. Id. The
only other states that provide for emergency payments are Alaska and Maryland.
See Alaska Stat. § 18.67.120 (Supp. 1972); Md. Ann. Code art. 26A § 11 (Supp.
1971).
129. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258A §§ 1-7 (1968).
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provide for subrogation to the rights

of the recipient of the award. The Attorney General of the United States
may, within three years from the date the order of compensation was
32
made, institute an action against the offenders.
Title I provides for a Criminal Victim Indemnity Fund 3 which will
be funded by subrogation recoveries, 8 4 and in addition:
[T]he Fund shall be the repository of (1) criminal fines paid in the various courts
of the United States, (2) additional amounts that may be appropriated to the
Fund as provided by law and (3) such other sums as may be contributed to
8 5
the Fund by public or private agencies, organizations, or persons.

The state statutes differ from Title I in that in all but two there is no
separate indemnity fund established into which subrogation recoveries,
criminal fines, additional appropriations, and public or private contributions may be deposited.'

IV.

Conclusion

Title I is more comprehensive in scope and coverage than any presently existing crime victims compensation statute. The drafters of Title
I, to be sure, have benefited from the experience gained by the other
jurisdictions in administering their own respective statutes.
130. Title I § 457(a).
131. Alaska Stat. § 18.67.140 (Supp. 1972); Cal. Gov't Code § 13963 (West
Supp. 1972); Md. Ann. Code art. 26A § 15 (Supp. 1971); Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
258A § 7 (1968); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 217.240 (1971); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52: 4B-20
(Supp. 1972); N.Y. Exec. Law § 634 (McKinney 1972); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann.
§ 12-25-10(a) (Supp. 1972). In Hawaii, the Commission may institute a derivative action in the name of the victim and recover such damages as may be recoverable at common law by the victim, without reference to the payment of
compensation by the Commission to the victim. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 351-35
(1968).
132. Title I § 457(a).
133. Title I § 458(a).
134. Id. § 457(a).
135. Id. § 458(a). Further, "[i]n any court of the United States . . . upon

conviction of a person of an offense resulting in personal injury, property loss, or
death, the court," after considering the financial condition of such person "may,
in addition to any other penalty," order such person to be fined $10,000 or less.
Id. § 104.
136. Such a fund is authorized under the California, Hawaii and Rhode
Island statutes. See Cal. Gov't Code § 13964 (West Supp. 1972); Hawaii Rev.
Stat. § 351-62.5(a) (Supp. 1972); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-25-12 (Supp. 1972).
See also 118 Cong. Rec. 15091 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1972).
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The federal statute is salutary, necessary, and long overdue. If and
when it does become law, an initial problem for the Board will be to
inform the public of the statute's existence. Once this is accomplished,
it appears that the statute can effectively and efficiently accomplish its
purpose-compensating the victims of crime.

